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This paper addresses the question of whether goods or asset market frictions are
necessary to explain the failure of consumption risk sharing across countries. I present
a multi-country DSGE model with Armington specialization. There are iceberg costs
of shipping goods across countries. In asset markets, contracts are imperfectly enforce-
able. Both frictions separately limit the extent to which countries can pool risk. The
model suggests a test for the presence of each of the two types of friction that can be
implemented using data on bilateral imports. I implement this test using a sample
of developed and developing countries. I ﬁnd that both trade costs and asset market
imperfections are necessary in order to explain the failure of perfect consumption risk
sharing. However the null hypothesis of ﬁnancial autarky is rejected.
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1 Introduction
In a world where there are no frictions in goods markets, and a full set of contingent claims can
be traded, consumption growth will be perfectly correlated across countries [Lucas (1982)].
However this prediction is strongly rejected by the data [see Backus, Kehoe and Kydland
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1(1992)]. Considerable progress has been made in understanding how diﬀerent types of goods
market frictions and diﬀerent types of asset market frictions can help resolve this puzzle.
This paper contributes to this literature by providing a new type of test for the role of
goods and asset market frictions in explaining failures of risk sharing. I present a multi-
country DSGE model with Armington specialization and iceberg costs of shipping goods
across countries. This is a dynamic stochastic “gravity” model of trade both within and
across states and periods. In asset markets, contracts are imperfectly enforceable. Both
frictions separately limit the extent to which countries can pool risk. But to the extent that
there is risk sharing, this paper shows it must show up in bilateral imports. With suﬃciently
rich data on bilateral imports, it is possible to distinguish between the role of trade costs and
asset market frictions in limiting risk sharing. I implement this test for a sample of developed
and developing countries from 1970-2000. Both trade costs and asset market imperfections
are necessary in order to explain the failure of perfect consumption risk sharing. However
the null hypothesis of ﬁnancial autarky is also rejected. Asset market frictions appear to be
relatively less important for developed than developing countries, and both types of friction
are less important at the end of the period than at the beginning.
The intuition for the results presented here can be understood by thinking of each country
as being endowed with a tree that produces a stochastic amount of a particular type of fruit
(this abstracts from investment, which is included in the formal model). Consumers in these
countries wish to smooth consumption along several dimensions. They prefer to consume a
variety rather than one single type of fruit. They also wish to smooth their consumption
across states of the world and over time. However some of the fruit spoils during shipping,
so the quantity received by the importer is less than the quantity sent by the exporter. The
fraction that spoils varies with the bilateral distance between the countries. This resource
cost of smoothing implies ﬁrst, that the composition of each country’s consumption basket
is tilted towards the fruits produced in countries that are “close.” Second, even if the full set
of Arrow-Debreu securities is traded, and all contracts are perfectly enforced, consumption
growth rates will diﬀer across countries.
Now suppose that in addition, contracts (other than spot trades) cannot be perfectly
enforced. Even though the full set of Arrow-Debreu securities can be traded, countries
cannot commit ex-ante to make transfers that are not ex-post optimal. Unless they are very
patient, the extent of possible risk sharing across countries will be further reduced. In the
2extreme case of ﬁnancial autarky, countries will engage only in spot trades, and the value of
a country’s exports must equal the value of its imports. Even in this case, however, there
will be some risk sharing, through movements in the terms of trade.
Clearly, in order for any degree of consumption smoothing to take place, there must be
bilateral ﬂows of fruits. This is the insight that motivates the empirical part of the paper. In
particular, the value of bilateral imports is given by a “gravity equation.” Once trade costs
(if present) have been controlled for, the value of bilateral imports always moves one-for-
one with the value of output of the exporting country. However the response of imports to
the value of output of the importing country varies depending on whether or not there are
frictions in asset markets. This allows the hypotheses of trade costs and frictions in asset
markets to be tested against the alternative of a frictionless world using a panel of data on
bilateral imports.
As already noted, this paper contributes to a very large literature that tries to explain the
failure of international consumption risk sharing. There are two strands of the literature that
focus primarily on goods market frictions: those that examine the role of non-traded goods,
and those that examine the role of transactions costs on goods trade. This paper falls into the
second category, which includes Backus, Kehoe and Kydland (1992, 1995), Heathcote and
Perri (2004a, b), Kose and Yi (2005), Mazzenga and Ravn (2004), and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ
(2000). This paper advances this literature by integrating costs of trading goods into a multi-
country DSGE model in a way that is consistent with a gravity model of bilateral trade. The
gravity equation is one of the outstanding successes of the empirical trade literature, and it
has recently received rigorous theoretical foundations in both Eaton and Kortum (2002) and
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003, 2004). The assumption of specialization gives the model a
chance to match facts about intra-state trade as well as inter-state and intertemporal trade,
while simultaneously nesting risk sharing through the terms of trade as described in Cole
and Obstfeld (1991). This treatment of trade costs paves the way for the new test for the
presence of frictions presented in the paper.
The enormous literature on international asset market frictions initially focused on exoge-
nously restricting the set of assets traded, but has recently explored the role of transactions
costs, asymmetric information and sovereign risk. This paper follows the latter approach, in
particular that of Kehoe and Perri (2002) who assume that contracts can only be enforced
by the threat of future exclusion from asset markets. This is convenient in the context of
3theoretical framework used here, but the empirical results should not be thought of as dis-
tinguishing between diﬀerent types of asset market imperfection. In this, the paper is similar
to Choi (2005) who looks at the eﬀect of non-traded goods and asset market frictions on the
relationship between real exchange rates and relative consumption. I also follow Heathcote
and Perri (2002) in considering the case of perfect ﬁnancial autarky.
The ﬁrst section describes the theoretical framework. The second section outlines the
empirical strategy. The third section describes the data and results. The ﬁnal section
concludes.
2 Theoretical framework
I ﬁrst lay out the frictionless model, and develop its implications for international risk sharing.
I then introduce in turn costs of trading goods and an enforcement friction in asset markets.
Again, I focus on the implications of these frictions for risk sharing. I also consider the
case of perfect ﬁnancial autarky as an extreme alternative to complete ﬁnancial markets.
Throughout, the emphasis is on consumption allocations and the form of trade ﬂows required
to support those allocations, rather than on asset holdings. The section concludes with an




There are N countries in the world, indexed i =1 ,...,N. Each country produces a
distinct intermediate good, (also indexed i) using capital and labor. Capital is accumulable,
while labor is ﬁxed in supply. Productivity in the production of intermediates diﬀers across
countries, and is stochastic. The intermediate goods are tradeable. They are combined using
a CES production function, identical in all countries, to produce an aggregate non-traded
good used for consumption and investment.
Uncertainty
The structure of uncertainty is as follows. In each period t, the economy experiences one
event, st ∈ S.D e n o t eb yst the history of events from date 0 to date t. The probability of
history st at date t is given by π(st).
4Utility and production















































where Z (k,st)i is absorption in country i of intermediate good k at time t after history st.


























where K (st−1)i is the capital available for use in production in country i at time t (prede-
termined) and I (st)i is investment in country i at time t after history st. Investment need
























where A(st)i is the realization of productivity in country i at time t after history st.
Planner’s problem
I study the social planning problem where the planner chooses sequences {C (st)i},




















subject to 2N resource constraints for every period t and history st.L e t t h e L a g r a n g e






























The multiplier σ(st)i is the date-0 price of a unit of the ﬁnal good in country i at time t
following history st. P (st)i is its date-t price. The multiplier µ(i,st) is the date-0 price of
a unit of good i in country i at time t following history st. Q(i,st) is then its date-t price.
If o c u so nt h eﬁrst order conditions of the planner’s problem with respect to consumption,
C and absorption of intermediates, Z (the ﬁrst order condition with respect to capital is not































Together with the two sets of resource constraints, the ﬁrst order conditions (including
the ﬁrst order condition with respect to capital) determine consumption of each good by
each country in every period and state. The appropriate values of λi in the decentralized
equilibrium without transfers can in principle be recovered by combining the ﬁrst order
conditions with the resource constraints and the individual country budget constraints.
Consumption correlations
Using the production function for the aggregate good X combined with the ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to absorption of individual intermediate goods, the date-t state-st
















The real exchange rate between i and j is given by the ratio of the price levels. In the
absence of frictions, the real exchange rate between any pair of countries is always equal to
1.
The ﬁrst order condition for consumption implies a monotonic relationship between the
















Since the real exchange rate between any pair of countries is always equal to 1, this implies








In order for this to be the case, the growth rate of consumption must be the same in all
countries. This is the expression from which standard tests of consumption risk sharing are
derived.
Bilateral imports
Risk sharing across countries takes place through bilateral trade ﬂows The ﬁrst order
conditions with respect to consumption and absorption of intermediates can be combined
with the resource constraints to yield the following expression for the value of country i’s









































This expression bears a strong resemblance to the standard gravity relationship between
the value of bilateral imports and the size of the exporting and importing countries in the
absence of trade costs. This form of the “gravity” relationship is unorthodox, but it turns
out to be useful for testing for the presence of frictions in goods and asset markets.















Resource cost of trade
7The setup is exactly as before, except that intermediate goods trade is costly: in order for
one unit of j’s good to arrive in i, t(st)ij units must be shipped, with t(st)ii =1 , t(st)ij ≥ 1
and t(st)ij t(st)jk ≥ t(st)ik. The intermediate goods resource constraints must be modiﬁed



























where t(st)ki is the quantity of good i that must be shipped from i to k in order for one unit
to arrive in k.
Planner’s problem and equilibrium
The planner’s problem is modiﬁed from the zero trade cost case in that the weighted
sum of country utilities is maximized subject to the modiﬁed resource constraints. The ﬁrst
order conditions with respect to consumption is unchanged. The ﬁrst order condition with
























As in the zero trade cost case, the two sets of resource constraints and the ﬁrst order
conditions (including the ﬁrst order condition with respect to capital) determine consumption
of each good by each country in every period and state. The appropriate values of λi in
the decentralized equilibrium without transfers can in principle be recovered by combining
the ﬁrst order conditions with the resource constraints and the individual country budget
constraints. Allowing for specialized endowments and costly trade modiﬁes several of the
predictions of the standard frictionless model. These modiﬁcations are now summarized:
Consumption correlations
Marginal utilities are not equalized across countries because relative prices diﬀer due to
trade costs. Using the production function for the aggregate good X combined with the
ﬁrst order conditions with respect to absorption of individual intermediate goods, the date-t





















8Purchasing power parity fails. The real exchange rate between i and j can diﬀer from 1.
However the ﬁrst order condition for consumption still implies a monotonic relationship
















But since price levels diﬀer across countries in a way that varies over time, this implies that
relative consumption is not constant.






























































The response of relative consumption between i and j to a shock to productivity in country k
clearly depends on the trade cost between i and k relative to the trade cost between j and k.
In order for consumption risk sharing to take place, goods must be shipped internationally,
and since it is costly to do so, agents will optimally choose not to smooth consumption
perfectly. In contrast to models with separable preferences over traded and non-traded goods,
this trade cost model predicts less than perfect correlation of the growth of traded goods
consumption across countries. In a world with trade costs, there is no “world consumption
growth rate,” or “world output growth rate,” as world consumption and output are diﬀerent
depending on where they are measured.
Bilateral imports
The risk sharing that takes place across countries must still be reﬂe c t e di nt r a d eﬂows.





























j X (st)j t(st)
1−η
kj
Again, this is a slightly unorthodox formulation of the standard gravity relationship in the
presence of trade costs, where bilateral imports depend on the size of the two countries,
bilateral trade costs, and “multilateral resistance” terms [see Anderson and van Wincoop




































































As will become clear presently, the former expression has the advantage over the latter that
it allows us to distinguish whether or not there are frictions in asset markets.
2.3 Enforcement constraint
Suppose now that output is perfectly observable, but countries cannot commit ex ante to
make payments that are not ex post optimal. Intertemporal and interstate trade across
countries is then feasible only to the extent to which payment can be enforced by the threat
of exclusion from future intertemporal, interstate and possibly intratemporal trade. This will
limit the degree of risk-sharing that can be supported. There are various possible equilibria
of this game. The degree of risk sharing that can be sustained is increasing in the severity of
the punishment. I assume that there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium of this game where
a country that defaults on its obligations to another country is excluded from participating
in some markets by all countries, forever.
Planner’s problem
The planner maximizes a weighted sum of country utilities subject to the standard re-




































The Lagrange multipliers on the resource constraints are as before. Let the Lagrange mul-
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and M (s−1)i = λi.







































The two sets of resource constraints, the IC constraints, the dynamic game which de-
termines uAutarky (st)i and V (st)i and the ﬁrst order conditions (including the ﬁrst order
condition with respect to capital) together determine consumption of each good by each
11country in every period and state. However it is not necessary to characterize the equilib-
rium allocation in order to derive a number of results on consumption correlations and the
reﬂection of consumption risk sharing in bilateral imports.
Consumption correlations
The relationship between the domestic price levels, trade costs and the price of interme-
diates in the country of production is exactly as in the case with no asset market friction.
If trade costs are non-zero, purchasing power parity fails. The relationship between the real

















The relative sum of multipliers M (st)i /M (st)j will in general depend on the consumption
allocation, so the relationship between the real exchange rate and relative consumption need
not be monotonic.1
































































Clearly, even if there are no trade costs, relative consumption is not constant, and consump-
tion growth rates are not perfectly correlated, due to the friction in asset markets.
Bilateral imports
In the presence of both types of friction, the risk sharing that takes place across countries
must still be reﬂe c t e di nt r a d eﬂows. The ﬁrst order conditions together with the resource
constraints yield the following expression for the value of country i’s consumption of k’s
1This implication of ﬁnancial frictions for the Backus-Smith puzzle is pointed out by Choi (2005).




























j X (st)j t(st)
1−η
jk
Again, this is a slightly unorthodox formulation of the standard gravity relationship. Ap-




































































Notice that the former expression has the advantage over the latter that it diﬀers depending
on whether or not there are asset market frictions.2
2.4 Financial autarky
Under ﬁnancial autarky, trade must be balanced in all periods and states of the world,
but spot trades are not restricted. At each point in time and for every realized history,
the representative agent in each country maximizes utility u(st)i subject to the i-country






























where Q(k,st) is the spot price in country k of good k. Denote the multipliers on the














2However from (31) it is not possible to distinguish enforcement frictions of the type presented here from
other types of asset market friction.



































































The two sets of resource constraints, the budget constraints and the ﬁrst order conditions
(including the ﬁrst order condition with respect to capital) together determine consumption
of each good by each country in every period and state. However it is not necessary to
characterize the equilibrium allocation in order to derive results on consumption correlations
and the reﬂection of consumption risk sharing in bilateral imports.
Consumption correlations
The relationship between the domestic price levels, trade costs and the spot price of
intermediates in the country of production is exactly as in the case of no asset market
frictions. If trade costs are non-zero, purchasing power parity fails. The relationship between
















The relative multipliers R(st)i /R(st)j will in general depend on the consumption allocation,
so as in the enforcement friction case, the relationship between the real exchange rate and
relative consumption need not be monotonic.
































































Even if there are no trade costs, relative consumption is not constant, and consumption
growth rates are not perfectly correlated. However, as in Cole and Obstfeld (1991), there is
some risk sharing through movements in the terms of trade, as long as trade costs and the
elasticity of substitution between diﬀerent goods are less than inﬁnite.
Bilateral imports
The ﬁrst order conditions together with the resource constraints yield the following ex-





























j X (st)j t(st)
1−η
jk
Making use of the fact that under ﬁnancial autarky, the value of a country’s output is equal




































































which closely resembles the form of the gravity equation derived by Anderson and van Win-
coop (2003).
152.5 A special case
For the purpose of building intuition, it is worth considering a special case of the above
model. Suppose that each of the N countries in the world is endowed with a distinct
tradeable intermediate. These intermediates are combined to produce a non-tradeable ﬁnal
consumption good using the same Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator as before. There is no production
or investment. Suppose that preferences are such that ρ =1 /η.3 In this case, when there





















































































When there are no frictions in asset markets, bilateral imports do not respond to shocks
to the value of importer GDP. Country i’s consumption of good k does not depend on i’s
current income. Under ﬁnancial autarky, bilateral imports move one-for-one with the value
of importer GDP. Country i’s consumption of good k moves one-for-one with i’s current
income. When there is a friction in asset markets, but some cross-state and cross-period
trade is possible, bilateral imports move with the value of importer GDP to the extent that
M (st)
η
i, the multiplier on i’s IC constraint, depends on i’s current GDP. It is tempting to
hypothesize that i’s consumption of good k moves with i’s current income, but less than
one-for-one.
3This is the special case of preferences consdered in Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996), Chapter 5.
163E m p i r i c a l s t r a t e g y
The predictions of the models outlined above with respect to the relationship between bi-
lateral imports, output, consumption and trade costs can be conveniently summarized. Let
IMikt denote the value of country i’s imports from country k in period t.L e tEXPit denote







where the implications of the diﬀerent assumptions are given by:
Assumption Θit Φkt t
1−η
ikt
























































Given data on bilateral imports and the other relevant variables, it is possible to test
which of these alternatives ﬁts the data best. Taking logs of (49) and substituting in the










ikt =1if i = k, z
m
ikt ≥ 1 otherwise (50)
the six diﬀerent assumptions about the conﬁguration of frictions can be implemented by
estimating six diﬀerent linear models. Let wikt =l n( IMikt/EXPitGDPkt), cit =l nCit and
zm
ikt =l nZm
ikt.L e tθit be an importer-year ﬁxed eﬀect, φkt an exporter-year ﬁxed eﬀect and
ψi an importer ﬁxed eﬀect. Then the six models are given by:
4See Anderson and van Wincoop (2004).
17Assumption Estimating equation















(4) Enforcement friction, no trade costs wikt = θit + φkt + εikt
(5) Financial autarky, no trade costs wikt = φit + φkt + εikt
(6) Complete ﬁnancial markets, no trade costs wikt = ψi + φkt + βccit + εikt
Notice that it is appropriate to impose the restrictions on the relationship between φkt and
the other variables in models (1), (2), (4) and (5) only if they are estimated using data on the
universe bilateral pairs (including imports from self). However, because of data availability
constraints, these restrictions will not be imposed.
The enforcement friction, trade cost model nests all the other possible conﬁgurations
of frictions. Hence, a likelihood ratio test can be used to test null hypotheses against the
alternative of frictions in both markets. The data used to implement this strategy is described
below. For many bilateral pairs in the sample used, bilateral imports are recorded as zero.
In order to avoid dropping these observations, one is added to all bilateral imports, so wikt
is constructed as ln[(1 + IMikt)/EXPitGDPkt]. All cases are estimated as two-way ﬁxed
eﬀe c tm o d e l s ,a st h en u m b e ro fd u m m yv a r i a b l e sw o u l do t h e r w i s eb ev e r yl a r g e .T h ef u l ls e t
of time-varying coeﬃcients on the gravity variables are not included, but these coeﬃcients
are allowed to vary across ﬁve-year periods.
4D a t a a n d r e s u l t s
Annual bilateral merchandise imports in current dollars from 1970 to 2000 are taken from
the NBER-United Nations Trade Data prepared by Feenstra and Lipsey. Household plus
government consumption measured in constant dollars, the current dollar value of GDP, the
current dollar value of total expenditure and the current dollar value of total imports are
taken from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). The largest possible
sample given the requirement that all of these variables be available for all sample years
consists of 70 developed and developing countries. The list of countries is in the Appendix.
For the purposes of estimating the gravity equation, data on variables that are correlated
18with trade costs are required. In choosing which variables to include, attention is restricted
to the subset of standard gravity variables that is least likely to be endogenously determined.
Bilateral distance in miles is calculated using the great circle distance algorithm provided
by Gray (2001). Dummy variables indicating common language, contiguity and a colonial
relationship post-1945 are constructed based on the CIA World Factbook.
O n ei s s u ei nm a p p i n gt h em o d e li n t ot h ed a t ai st h a tw eh a v ed a t ao nt h ev a l u eo f
bilateral merchandise imports, not bilateral imports. Data on bilateral service trade are not




Table 1 reports the results from estimating the six models described above using all
bilateral pairs in the 70-country sample. The estimated coeﬃcients on the gravity variables in
the models with trade costs are fairly standard and do not change much across speciﬁcations.
They strongly suggest that trade costs are falling over time, most rapidly in the ﬁrst half of
t h es a m p l ep e r i o d .
Table 2 reports the likelihood ratio test statistics and p-values for the ﬁve hypothesis
tests, taking the trade cost and enforcement friction model as the alternative hypothesis in
each case. The null of no frictions in asset markets is rejected at all signiﬁcance levels. The
null of ﬁnancial autarky is rejected at all signiﬁcance levels. The null of no trade costs is
also rejected at all signiﬁcance levels. Data on bilateral imports strongly suggests that both
types of friction are necessary to explain the failure of international risk sharing, while at
t h es a m et i m eﬁnancial autarky is rejected.
The estimated coeﬃcients on the gravity variables in Table 1 can be used to construct
ﬁtted values of bilateral trade costs between all country pairs for the 6 ﬁve-year intervals
covered by the sample. This requires an estimate of the elasticity of substitution, η. Following
Anderson and van Wincoop, a baseline elasticity of 6 is used. Table 3 reports summary
statistics of the implied trade costs. Using this elasticity, the predicted trade costs are very
high, much higher than the measured costs of trade for goods that are actually traded. One
way to understand this is to think of the costs constructed here as a weighted average applying
to all of output, including the large fraction that is non-traded. Another possible explanation
19is that there are both ﬁxed and per unit costs of trade. The failure of the empirical model used
here to take account of ﬁxed costs may lead to upwardly-biased estimates of per unit trade
costs [see Helpman, Melitz and Rubinstein (2004)]. At any rate, the evidence presented here
strongly suggests a much greater macroeconomic role for trade costs than usually presumed
in the international real business cycle literature.
Results by level of development
To test the plausibility of these results, the same models are estimated on two subsamples
of the data, one containing only observations on bilateral imports between 21 OECD coun-
tries, and the other containing only observations on bilateral imports between the remaining
49 countries. These results are reported in Table 4 and Table 7. The coeﬃcients on the
gravity variables in the models with trade costs are quite diﬀerent in the two samples. The
implied trade costs are substantially larger in the non-OECD sample than in the OECD
sample (see Tables 6 and 9).
Tables 5 and 8 report the likelihood ratio test statistics and p-values for the two samples.
In both samples, the null of no asset market frictions but costly trade is rejected against
the alternative of frictions in both goods and asset markets. For the non-OECD sample,
the rejection is at all signiﬁcance levels. For the OECD sample, the null is rejected at all
conventional levels of signiﬁcance, but the p-value is just under one half. In both samples,
the null of asset market frictions but no trade costs is rejected against the alternative of
frictions in both goods and asset markets at all levels of signiﬁcance. The null of ﬁnancial
autarky is also rejected in favor of some degree of risk sharing through intertemporal trade.
Results by period
As a further test of plausibility, the same models are estimated separately on the ﬁrst
half of the time-period (1970-1984) and the second half of the time period (1985-2000). The
estimation results are reported in Table 10 and Table 12. The implied trade costs are on
average lower in the second period compared with the ﬁrst period. Tables 11 and 13 report
the likelihood ratio test statistics and p-values for the two samples. In both samples, the null
of no asset market frictions but costly trade is rejected against the alternative of frictions in
both goods and asset markets. Similarly, the null of ﬁnancial autarky is rejected in favor of
the alternative of some risk sharing through ﬁnancial markets. It is interesting to note that
the rejection of the null of trade cost frictions but no asset market frictions is weaker in the
second period than in the ﬁrst period.
205C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presents a multi-country model with frictions in goods and asset markets. The
goods market friction takes the form of costs of trading goods, while the friction in asset
markets takes the form of limited enforcement. Both of these frictions separately reduce
the extent to which countries can pool risk. The model suggests a test for the presence of
each of the two types of friction that can be implemented using data on bilateral imports. I
implement this test using a sample of developed and developing countries. The results suggest
that both trade costs and asset market imperfections are necessary in order to explain the
failure of perfect consumption risk sharing. However there is some risk sharing through
intertemporal trade, and asset market frictions are less important for developed than for
developing countries.
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22variable interaction coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
ln(consumption) none . . . . 0.00 0.00 . . . . 0.00 0.00
ln(1+dist) 1970-1974 -1.49 0.05 ** -1.49 0.05 ** -1.47 0.04 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1975-1979 -1.23 0.05 ** -1.23 0.05 ** -1.30 0.05 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1980-1984 -0.84 0.05 ** -0.84 0.05 ** -1.06 0.05 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1985-1989 -0.62 0.05 ** -0.62 0.05 ** -0.78 0.05 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1990-1994 -0.69 0.05 ** -0.69 0.05 ** -0.59 0.04 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1995-2000 -0.71 0.04 ** -0.71 0.04 ** -0.44 0.04 ** . . . . . .
not contiguous 1970-1974 -0.74 0.21 ** -0.74 0.21 ** -0.53 0.23 ** . . . . . .
not contiguous 1975-1979 -0.13 0.24 -0.13 0.24 0.20 0.25 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1980-1984 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.68 0.24 ** . . . . . .
not contiguous 1985-1989 -0.32 0.22 -0.32 0.22 -0.24 0.22 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1990-1994 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.21 -0.05 0.21 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1995-2000 0.47 0.18 ** 0.47 0.18 ** -0.16 0.19 . . . . . .
no common lang. 1970-1974 -2.67 0.08 ** -2.67 0.08 ** -3.18 0.08 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1975-1979 -1.96 0.08 ** -1.96 0.09 ** -2.20 0.08 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1980-1984 -1.60 0.09 ** -1.60 0.09 ** -1.53 0.09 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1985-1989 -1.44 0.09 ** -1.44 0.09 ** -1.06 0.09 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1990-1994 -1.78 0.09 ** -1.78 0.09 ** -1.57 0.09 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1995-2000 -1.60 0.08 ** -1.60 0.08 ** -1.51 0.08 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1970-1974 -1.93 0.15 ** -1.93 0.14 ** -1.28 0.14 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1975-1979 -2.39 0.16 ** -2.39 0.16 ** -2.13 0.15 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1980-1984 -2.88 0.17 ** -2.88 0.17 ** -3.06 0.17 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1985-1989 -3.17 0.18 ** -3.17 0.17 ** -3.69 0.16 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1990-1994 -2.63 0.18 ** -2.63 0.18 ** -2.87 0.16 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1995-2000 -2.54 0.17 ** -2.54 0.17 ** -2.51 0.15 ** . . . . . .
importer fixed effects no no yes no no yes
importer-year fixed effects yes no no yes no no
exporter-year fixed effects yes no yes yes no yes




Dependent variable is log(1+IMij/EXPiGDPj). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
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Table 1: Regression results for full sample of 70 countries, 1970-2000
(1) (4) (5) (6)
Null Alternative LR d.f. N p-value
Trade costs, no asset market friction trade, asset friction 9403 2099 149730 1
Trade costs, financial autarky trade, asset friction 9204 2170 149730 1
No trade costs, asset market friction trade, asset friction 9849 24 149730 1
No trade costs, financial autarky trade, asset friction 18484 2194 149730 1
No frictions trade, asset friction 19197 2123 149730 1
LR test statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with d.f. as given
A p-value greater than 0.05 indicates rejection of the null at the 5% significance level
Table 2: Likelihood ratio test results for full sample of 70 countries, 1970-2000
elasticity of substitution = 6 elasticity of substitution = 9
Period Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
1970-1974 3175 490 4742 775 203 1030
1975-1979 1687 405 2368 502 175 642
1980-1984 811 246 1053 296 117 361
1985-1989 618 174 766 242 88 285
1990-1994 578 168 734 230 85 277
1995-2000 550 169 699 221 85 266
Trade costs are expressed as a percentage of the home country price
Table 3: Fitted trade costs for full sample of 70 countries
23variable interaction coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
ln(consumption) none . . . . 0.00 0.00 . . . . 0.00 0.00
ln(1+dist) 1970-1974 -3.13 0.07 ** -3.13 0.07 ** -3.59 0.07 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1975-1979 -2.97 0.08 ** -2.97 0.08 ** -3.23 0.08 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1980-1984 -2.28 0.07 ** -2.28 0.07 ** -2.48 0.08 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1985-1989 -1.71 0.07 ** -1.71 0.07 ** -1.66 0.08 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1990-1994 -1.57 0.08 ** -1.57 0.08 ** -1.28 0.07 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1995-2000 -1.60 0.07 ** -1.60 0.07 ** -1.13 0.07 ** . . . . . .
not contiguous 1970-1974 -0.78 0.22 ** -0.78 0.22 ** 0.15 0.24 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1975-1979 0.32 0.30 0.32 0.30 0.92 0.31 ** . . . . . .
not contiguous 1980-1984 0.49 0.30 0.49 0.30 0.97 0.33 ** . . . . . .
not contiguous 1985-1989 -0.53 0.28 * -0.53 0.28 * -0.74 0.29 ** . . . . . .
not contiguous 1990-1994 0.23 0.27 0.23 0.27 -0.40 0.28 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1995-2000 0.68 0.24 ** 0.68 0.24 ** -0.29 0.25 . . . . . .
no common lang. 1970-1974 -2.77 0.11 ** -2.77 0.12 ** -3.07 0.12 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1975-1979 -1.81 0.12 ** -1.81 0.12 ** -1.92 0.12 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1980-1984 -1.52 0.11 ** -1.52 0.12 ** -1.56 0.13 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1985-1989 -1.25 0.11 ** -1.25 0.12 ** -1.08 0.12 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1990-1994 -1.89 0.12 ** -1.89 0.12 ** -1.74 0.12 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1995-2000 -1.74 0.10 ** -1.74 0.11 ** -1.62 0.11 ** . . . . . .
importer fixed effects no no yes no no yes
importer-year fixed effects yes no no yes no no
exporter-year fixed effects yes no yes yes no yes




Dependent variable is log(1+IMij/EXPiGDPj). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
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General friction Autarky No friction
Goods market Trade costs Trade costs Trade costs No trade costs No trade costs No trade costs
Asset market General friction Autarky No friction
(2) (3)
Table 4: Regression results for non-OECD countries only, 1970-2000
(1) (4) (5) (6)
Null Alternative LR d.f. N p-value
Trade costs, no asset market friction trade, asset friction 7381 1469 72912 1
Trade costs, financial autarky trade, asset friction 6808 1519 72912 1
No trade costs, asset market friction trade, asset friction 12916 18 72912 1
No trade costs, financial autarky trade, asset friction 18660 1537 72912 1
No frictions trade, asset friction 19986 1487 72912 1
LR test statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with d.f. as given
A p-value greater than 0.05 indicates rejection of the null at the 5% significance level
Table 5: Likelihood ratio test results for 49 non-OECD countries, 1970-2000
elasticity of substitution = 6 elasticity of substitution = 9
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
1970-1974 37825 1745 74572 3864 518 6148
1975-1979 19314 1488 36384 2526 463 3893
1980-1984 5364 734 8952 1099 277 1571
1985-1989 2305 390 3477 622 170 835
1990-1994 1744 332 2611 511 150 687
1995-2000 1617 343 2424 485 154 652
Trade costs are expressed as a percentage of the home country price
Table 6: Fitted trade costs for sample of 49 non-OECD countries
24variable interaction coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
ln(consumption) none . . . . 0.00 0.00 . . . . 0.00 0.00
ln(1+dist) 1970-1974 -0.95 0.04 ** -0.95 0.03 ** -1.03 0.02 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1975-1979 -1.02 0.03 ** -1.02 0.03 ** -1.04 0.02 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1980-1984 -1.10 0.03 ** -1.10 0.03 ** -1.08 0.02 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1985-1989 -1.07 0.03 ** -1.07 0.03 ** -1.07 0.02 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1990-1994 -1.12 0.03 ** -1.12 0.03 ** -1.07 0.02 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1995-2000 -1.10 0.03 ** -1.10 0.03 ** -1.07 0.02 ** . . . . . .
not contiguous 1970-1974 -0.08 0.06 -0.08 0.06 0.02 0.06 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1975-1979 -0.04 0.06 -0.04 0.06 0.02 0.06 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1980-1984 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1985-1989 0.07 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.04 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1990-1994 0.13 0.05 ** 0.13 0.05 ** 0.06 0.05 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1995-2000 0.13 0.05 ** 0.13 0.05 ** 0.08 0.05 . . . . . .
no common lang. 1970-1974 -0.56 0.06 ** -0.56 0.06 ** -0.51 0.05 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1975-1979 -0.46 0.06 ** -0.46 0.06 ** -0.48 0.05 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1980-1984 -0.42 0.05 ** -0.42 0.05 ** -0.41 0.04 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1985-1989 -0.41 0.04 ** -0.41 0.05 ** -0.40 0.04 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1990-1994 -0.39 0.04 ** -0.39 0.05 ** -0.40 0.04 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1995-2000 -0.39 0.04 ** -0.39 0.04 ** -0.42 0.04 ** . . . . . .
importer fixed effects no no yes no no yes
importer-year fixed effects yes no no yes no no
exporter-year fixed effects yes no yes yes no yes




Dependent variable is log(1+IMij/EXPiGDPj). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
Table 7: Regression results for OECD countries only, 1970-2000
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asset market General friction Autarky No friction General friction Autarky No friction
Goods market Trade costs Trade costs Trade costs No trade costs No trade costs No trade costs
0.88 0.85 0.87 0.66 0.63 0.66
13020 13020 13020 13020 13020 13020
Null Alternative LR d.f. N p-value
Trade costs, no asset market friction trade, asset friction 626 629 13020 0.47
Trade costs, financial autarky trade, asset friction 3163 651 13020 1
No trade costs, asset market friction trade, asset friction 13488 18 13020 1
No trade costs, financial autarky trade, asset friction 14700 669 13020 1
No frictions trade, asset friction 13705 647 13020 1
LR test statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with d.f. as given
A p-value greater than 0.05 indicates rejection of the null at the 5% significance level
Table 8: Likelihood ratio test results for 21 OECD countries, 1970-2000
elasticity of substitution = 6 elasticity of substitution = 9
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
1970-1974 380 155 580 165 79 231
1975-1979 424 174 657 180 88 254
1980-1984 478 197 756 197 97 283
1985-1989 446 187 700 187 93 267
1990-1994 483 201 765 199 99 285
1995-2000 466 196 735 193 97 277
Trade costs are expressed as a percentage of the home country price
Table 9: Fitted trade costs for sample of 21 OECD countries
25variable interaction coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
ln(consumption) none . . . . 0.00 0.00 . . . . 0.00 0.00
ln(1+dist) 1970-1974 -1.49 0.05 ** -1.49 0.05 ** -1.38 0.04 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1975-1979 -1.23 0.05 ** -1.23 0.05 ** -1.21 0.05 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1980-1984 -0.84 0.05 ** -0.84 0.05 ** -0.97 0.05 ** . . . . . .
not contiguous 1970-1974 -0.74 0.21 ** -0.74 0.21 ** -0.87 0.22 ** . . . . . .
not contiguous 1975-1979 -0.13 0.24 -0.13 0.24 -0.14 0.24 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1980-1984 0.19 0.24 0.19 0.24 0.34 0.24 . . . . . .
no common lang. 1970-1974 -2.67 0.08 ** -2.67 0.08 ** -2.95 0.08 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1975-1979 -1.96 0.08 ** -1.96 0.09 ** -1.97 0.08 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1980-1984 -1.60 0.09 ** -1.60 0.09 ** -1.30 0.09 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1970-1974 -1.93 0.15 ** -1.93 0.14 ** -1.52 0.14 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1975-1979 -2.39 0.16 ** -2.39 0.16 ** -2.38 0.15 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1980-1984 -2.88 0.17 ** -2.88 0.17 ** -3.30 0.16 ** . . . . . .
importer fixed effects no no yes no no yes
importer-year fixed effects yes no no yes no no
exporter-year fixed effects yes no yes yes no yes




Dependent variable is log(1+IMij/EXPiGDPj). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
Table 10: Regression results for full sample of 70 countries, 1970-1984 only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Asset market General friction Autarky No friction General friction Autarky No friction
Goods market Trade costs Trade costs Trade costs No trade costs No trade costs No trade costs
0.53 0.49 0.50 0.48 0.44 0.45
72450 72450 72450 72450 72450 72450
Null Alternative LR d.f. N p-value
Trade costs, no asset market friction trade, asset friction 4294 979 72450 1
Trade costs, financial autarky trade, asset friction 4870 1050 72450 1
No trade costs, asset market friction trade, asset friction 7267 12 72450 1
No trade costs, financial autarky trade, asset friction 11686 1062 72450 1
No frictions trade, asset friction 11261 991 72450 1
LR test statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with d.f. as given
A p-value greater than 0.05 indicates rejection of the null at the 5% significance level
Table 11: Likelihood ratio test results for full sample of countries, 1970-1984
26variable interaction coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e. coeff. s.e.
ln(consumption) none . . . . 0.00 0.00 . . . . 0.00 0.00
ln(1+dist) 1985-1989 -0.62 0.05 ** -0.62 0.05 ** -0.87 0.05 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1990-1994 -0.69 0.05 ** -0.69 0.05 ** -0.67 0.04 ** . . . . . .
ln(1+dist) 1995-2000 -0.71 0.04 ** -0.71 0.04 ** -0.53 0.04 ** . . . . . .
not contiguous 1985-1989 -0.32 0.22 -0.32 0.22 0.08 0.21 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1990-1994 0.30 0.21 0.30 0.21 0.27 0.20 . . . . . .
not contiguous 1995-2000 0.47 0.18 ** 0.47 0.18 ** 0.16 0.18 . . . . . .
no common lang. 1985-1989 -1.44 0.09 ** -1.44 0.09 ** -1.27 0.09 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1990-1994 -1.78 0.09 ** -1.78 0.09 ** -1.79 0.08 ** . . . . . .
no common lang. 1995-2000 -1.60 0.08 ** -1.60 0.08 ** -1.72 0.08 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1985-1989 -3.17 0.18 ** -3.17 0.17 ** -3.46 0.17 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1990-1994 -2.63 0.18 ** -2.63 0.18 ** -2.64 0.17 ** . . . . . .
no colonial rel. 1995-2000 -2.54 0.17 ** -2.54 0.17 ** -2.28 0.16 ** . . . . . .
importer fixed effects no no yes no no yes
importer-year fixed effects yes no no yes no no
exporter-year fixed effects yes no yes yes no yes




Dependent variable is log(1+IMij/EXPiGDPj). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%
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Table 12: Regression results for full sample of 70 countries, 1985-2000 only
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Null Alternative LR d.f. N p-value
Trade costs, no asset market friction trade, asset friction 1143 1049 77280 0.98
Trade costs, financial autarky trade, asset friction 4407 1120 77280 1
No trade costs, asset market friction trade, asset friction 2968 12 77280 1
No trade costs, financial autarky trade, asset friction 7213 1132 77280 1
No frictions trade, asset friction 4110 1061 77280 1
LR test statistic is asymptotically distributed as chi-squared with d.f. as given
A p-value greater than 0.05 indicates rejection of the null at the 5% significance level
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